Hidden Markov models for the activity profile of terrorist groups by Raghavan, Vasanthan et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
20
7.
14
97
v3
  [
sta
t.A
P]
  1
5 J
an
 20
14
The Annals of Applied Statistics
2013, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2402–2430
DOI: 10.1214/13-AOAS682
c© Institute of Mathematical Statistics, 2013
HIDDEN MARKOV MODELS FOR THE ACTIVITY PROFILE OF
TERRORIST GROUPS1
By Vasanthan Raghavan∗, Aram Galstyan∗ and
Alexander G. Tartakovsky∗,†
University of Southern California∗ and University of Connecticut†
The main focus of this work is on developing models for the activ-
ity profile of a terrorist group, detecting sudden spurts and downfalls
in this profile, and, in general, tracking it over a period of time. To-
ward this goal, a d-state hidden Markov model (HMM) that captures
the latent states underlying the dynamics of the group and thus its
activity profile is developed. The simplest setting of d= 2 corresponds
to the case where the dynamics are coarsely quantized as Active and
Inactive, respectively. A state estimation strategy that exploits the
underlying HMM structure is then developed for spurt detection and
tracking. This strategy is shown to track even nonpersistent changes
that last only for a short duration at the cost of learning the under-
lying model. Case studies with real terrorism data from open-source
databases are provided to illustrate the performance of the proposed
methodology.
1. Introduction. Terrorist attacks can have an enormous impact on wide
sections of society [Mueller and Stewart (2011)]. Thus, the continued study of
terrorism is of utmost importance. In this direction, it is imperative to track
the activity of terrorist groups so that effective and appropriate counter-
terrorism measures can be quickly undertaken to restore order and stability.
In particular, detecting sudden spurts and downfalls in the activity profile
of terrorist groups can help in understanding terrorist group dynamics.
The basic element toward these goals is the collation of data on terror-
ist activities perpetrated by a group of interest. Over the last decade, many
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databases such as ITERATE, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) [LaFree
and Dugan (2007)], the RAND Database on Worldwide Terrorism Incidents
(RDWTI), etc., have made data on terrorism available in an open-source
setting. However, even the best efforts on collecting data cannot overcome
issues of temporal ambiguity, missing data and attributional ambiguity. In
addition, the very nature of terrorism makes it a rare occurrence from the
viewpoint of model learning and inferencing. Thus, there has been an in-
creased interest on parsimonious models for terrorism with strong explana-
tory and predictive powers.
Prior work on modeling the activity profile of terrorist groups falls un-
der one of the following three categories. Enders and Sandler (1993, 2000,
2002) use classical time-series analysis techniques to propose a threshold
auto-regressive (TAR) model and study both the short-run as well as the
long-run spurt in world terrorist activity over the period from 1970 to 1999.
On the other hand, LaFree, Morris and Dugan (2010) and Dugan, LaFree and
Piquero (2005) adopt group-based trajectory analysis techniques (Cox pro-
portional hazards model or zero-inflated Poisson model) to identify regional
terrorism trends with similar developmental paths. The common theme that
ties both these sets of works is that the optimal number of underlying latent
groups and the associated parameters that best fit the data remain variable
with the parameters chosen to optimize a metric such as the Akaike Infor-
mation Criterion (AIC), the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), etc., or
via logistic regression methods. While acceptable model fits are obtained
in these works, the complicated dependency relationships between the en-
dogenous and exogenous variables makes inferencing nontransparent. In ad-
dition, both sets of works take a contagion theoretic viewpoint [Midlarsky
(1978), Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida (1980)] that the current activity
of the group is explicitly dependent on the past history of the group, which
accounts for clustering effects in the activity profile.
The third category that provides a theoretical foundation and an expla-
nation for clustering of attacks is Porter and White (2012), where an easily
decomposable two-component self-exciting hurdle model (SEHM) for the ac-
tivity profile is introduced [Hawkes (1971), Cox and Isham (1980)]. In its
simplest form, the hurdle component of the model creates data sparsity by
ensuring a prespecified density of zero counts, while the self-exciting compo-
nent induces clustering of data. Self-exciting models have become increas-
ingly popular in diverse fields such as seismology [Ogata (1988, 1998)], gang
behavior modeling [Mohler et al. (2011), Cho et al. (2013)] and insurgency
dynamics [Lewis et al. (2011)].
We propose an alternate modeling framework to the TAR model and the
SEHM by hypothesizing that an increase (or decrease) in attack intensity can
be naturally attributed to certain changes in the group’s internal states that
reflect the dynamics of its evolution, rather than the fact that the group
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has already carried out attacks on either the previous day/week/month.
Specifically, while the TAR model and the SEHM assume that the tem-
poral clustering of attacks is due to aftershocks caused by an event, the
assumption underlying our approach is that the clustering can be explained
in terms of some unobserved dynamics of the organization (e.g., switching
to different tactics), which we address via a hidden Markov model (HMM)
framework. We propose a d-state HMM for the activity profile where each of
the d possible values corresponds to a certain distinct level in the underlying
attributes. The simplest nontrivial setting of d= 2 with Active and Inactive
states is shown to be a good model that captures most of the facets of real
terrorism data.
The advantages of the proposed framework are many. The d-state HMM
is built on a small set of easily motivated hypotheses and is parsimoniously
described by d(d + 1) model parameters. While observed data rarity can
be explained by state transitions, clustering of attacks can be attributed
to different intensity profiles in the different states. In addition, the HMM
paradigm allows the use of a mature and computationally efficient toolkit
for model learning and inferencing [see, e.g., Rabiner (1989)].
Our experimental studies with two data sets (FARC and Indonesia/Timor-
Leste) suggest that, in terms of explanatory power, both HMM and SEHM
perform reasonably well, with neither framework clearly outperforming the
other. In particular, the HMM does better for the FARC data set, whereas
the SEHM is the better option for Timor-Leste (which is a data set where
attacks are collated across groups and thus has heavier tails in terms of
severity of attacks). On the other hand, our results also show that the HMM
approach predicts the time to the next day of activity more accurately than
the SEHM for both data sets, suggesting that the former model might have
a better generalization capability. While this conclusion does not imply that
either framework can be accepted (or rejected) and a further careful study is
necessary, it clearly demonstrates that the HMM approach advocated here
is a competing alternate modeling framework for real terrorism data.
In addition, we develop a strategy to quickly identify a sudden spurt
(or a sudden downfall) in the activity profile of the group. This strategy
exploits the HMM structure by learning the model parameters to estimate
the most probable state sequence using the Viterbi algorithm. We show that
this approach allows one to not only detect nonpersistent changes in terrorist
group dynamics, but also to identify key geopolitical undercurrents that lead
to sudden spurts/downfalls in a group’s activity.
2. Preliminaries.
2.1. Qualitative features of activity profile. A typical example of the ac-
tivity profile is presented in Figure 1 where the number of days of terrorist
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Fig. 1. (a) Number of days of terrorist activity, and (b) Total number of attacks in a
δ-day time window as a function of time for FARC (δ = 15 days). The key geopolitical
events in this period are also marked.
activity in a δ = 15 day time window and the total number of attacks within
the same time window are plotted as a function of time. The focus of this
example is Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), stud-
ied in Section 5.1. The data for Figure 1 is obtained from the RDWTI and
corresponds to incidents over the nine-year period from 1998 to 2006. From
Figure 1 and a careful study of the activity profile of many terrorist groups
from similar databases, we highlight some of the important features of ter-
rorism data that impact modeling:
• Temporal ambiguity : The exact instance (time) of occurrence of a terror-
ism incident is hard to pinpoint. This is because accounts of most terrorist
events are from third-party sources. Thus, the granularity of incident re-
portage (i.e., the time scale on which incidents are reported) that is most
relevant is discrete, typically days.
• Attributional ambiguity : Further, in many of the databases, there exists
an ambiguity in attributing a certain terrorism incident to a specific group
when multiple groups contest on the same geographical turf. Some of this
ambiguity can be resolved by attributing an incident to a specific group
based on the attack signature (attack target type, operational details,
strategies involved, etc.). However, this is an intensive manual exercise
and there is necessarily a certain ambiguity in this resolution.
• Data sparsity : Despite the recent surge in media attention on trans-
national terrorist activities and insurgencies, terrorism incidents are “rare”
(from the perspective of model learning) even for some of the most active
terrorist groups. For example, the data in Figure 1 corresponds to 604
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incidents over a nine-year period leading to an average of ≈1.29 incidents
per week. While a case can be made that these databases report only a
subset of the true activity, the fact that significant amount of resources
have to be invested by the terrorist group for every new incident acts as
a natural dampener toward more attacks.
These three features make a strong case for parsimonious models for the
activity profile of terrorist groups. Further, any good model should be robust
to a small number of errors in terms of mislabeled data and missing data
supplied from other terrorism incident databases.
2.2. Prior work. The activity profile of a terrorist group can be modeled
as a discrete-time stochastic process. Let the first and last day of the time
period of interest be denoted as Day 1 and Day N , respectively. Let Mi
denote the number of terrorism incidents on the ith day of observation,
i = 1, . . . ,N . Note that Mi can take values from the set {0,1,2, . . .} with
Mi = 0 corresponding to no terrorist activity on the ith day of observation.
On the other hand, there could be multiple terrorism incidents corresponding
to independent attacks on a given day, reflecting a high level of coordination
between various subgroups of the group. Let Hi denote the history of the
group’s activity till day i. That is, Hi = {M1, . . . ,Mi}, i = 1,2, . . . ,N with
H0 =∅. The point process model is complete if P(Mi = r|Hi−1) is specified
as a function of Hi−1 for all i= 1, . . . ,N and r = 0,1,2, . . . .
We noted in Section 1 that prior work on models for the activity profile
fall under one of three categories. In the time-series techniques pioneered
by Enders and Sandler (2000), a nonlinear trend component, a seasonality
(cyclic) component and a stationary component are fitted to the time-series
data of worldwide terrorism incidents. In particular, the following model-fit
is proposed for {Mi}:∑
i∈∆q
Mi =
n∑
j=0
αjq
j + β sin(ωq + φ) + µq,
where ∆q denotes the period corresponding to the qth quarter in the pe-
riod of observation and {n,α0, . . . , αn, β,ω,φ,Var(µq)} are parameters to be
optimized over some parameter space. This modeling effort results in an
eight-parameter model (4 for the trend component, 3 for the seasonality
component and a variance parameter for the stationary component) which
is then used to identify a rough 4 and 1/2-year cycle in terrorism events.
Further, a nonlinear trend and seasonality component ensures that trends in
terrorism cannot be predicted, thus explaining the observed boom and bust
cycles in terrorist activity. Alternately, a TAR model that switches from one
auto-regressive process to another with the switches corresponding to key
geopolitical events is studied in Enders and Sandler (2002).
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On the other hand, the SEHM of Porter and White (2012) is described
as
P(Mi = r|Hi−1) =

e−(Bi+SEi(Hi−1)), r = 0,
r−s
ζ(s)
· (1− e−(Bi+SEi(Hi−1))), r ≥ 1,
(2.1)
where Bi is a baseline process, and SEi(·) is the self-exciting component
given as
SEi(Hi−1) =
∑
j:j<i,Mj>0
αjg(i− j)
for an appropriate choice of decay function g(·) and influence parameters
{αj}. On the other hand, s ∈ (1,∞) is an appropriately chosen parameter
of the zeta distribution, and ζ(s) =
∑∞
n=1 n
−s is the Riemann-zeta function.
While a constant s parameter leads to the simplest modeling framework, s
can in general be driven by another self-exciting process. A class described by
eight parameters is studied in Porter and White (2012) and it is shown that
a four-parameter model optimizes an AIC metric for terrorism data from
Indonesia/Timor-Leste over the period from 1994 to 2007. This model is
shown to accurately capture terrorism data (especially the extreme outliers
such as days with 36,11 and 10 attacks). The heavy-tailed zeta distribution is
also explored in Clauset, Young and Gleditsch (2007) for modeling extremal
terrorist events.
3. Proposed model for the activity profile. While the above set of mod-
els capture terrorism data, we now propose a competing alternate framework
based on HMMs. Our proposed framework is based on the following simpli-
fying hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 1: The activity profile of a terrorist group {Mi, i= 1, . . . ,N}
depends only on certain states (Si) in the sense that the current activity is
conditionally independent of the past activity/history of the group given
the current state:
P(Mi|Hi−1,Si) = P(Mi|Si), i= 1,2, . . . .
In other words, these states completely capture the facets from the past
history of the group in determining the current state of activity. While
attaching specific meanings to Si is not the focus of this paper, an example
in this direction is the postulate by Cragin and Daly (2004) that the
Intentions and the Capabilities of a group could serve as these states.
• Hypothesis 2: The dynamics of terrorism are well understood if the under-
lying states {Si} are known. However, in reality, Si cannot be observed
directly and we can only make indirect inferences about it by observing
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Fig. 2. A simple d= 2 state HMM for the activity of a terrorist group.
{Mj , j = 1, . . . , i}. To allow inferencing of Si, we propose a d-state model
that captures the dynamics of the group’s latent states over time. That
is, Si ∈ {0,1, . . . , d− 1} with each distinct value corresponding to a differ-
ent level in the underlying attributes of the group. Further, we penalize
frequent state transitions in the terrorist group dynamics by constraining
Si to be fixed over a block (time window) of δ days, where δ is chosen
appropriately based on the group dynamics.
A typical illustration of this framework with d= 2 is provided in Figure 2,
where the state over the nth time window (∆n, n= 1,2, . . . ,K) correspond-
ing to ∆n = {(n− 1)δ +1, . . . , nδ} and K = ⌈
N
δ
⌉ is given as
Si|i∈∆n = sn, sn ∈ {0,1}.
In the Inactive state (sn = 0), the underlying Mi form a low-“rate” point
process, whereas in the Active state (sn = 1), the Mi form a high-“rate”
point process. Thus, a state transition from sn−1 = 0 to sn = 1 indicates a
spurt in the activity of the group, whereas an opposite change indicates a
downfall in the activity. This evolution in the states of the group is modeled
by a state transition probability matrix P= {Pij}, where
P=
[
1− p0 p0
q0 1− q0
]
with Pij , P(sn = j|sn−1 = i), i, j ∈ {0,1}. In general, there exists a trade-off
between accurate modeling of the group’s latent attributes (larger d is better
for this task) versus estimating more model parameters (smaller d is better).
While attention in the sequel will be restricted to the d= 2 setting because
of the implementation ease of the proposed approaches in this setting, these
approaches can be easily extended to a general d-state setting.
To model the observations in either state [i.e., P(Mi|Si = j), j = 0,1], a
geometric density can be motivated with the following hypothetical scenario.
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Consider a setting where the group has infinite resources2 and orchestrates
Mi attacks on the ith day till the success of a certain short-term policy
objective can be declared. Every additional attack contributes equally to
the success of this objective and, as long as the group’s objective has not
been met, attaining this objective in the future is not dependent on the past
attacks. In other words, the group remains memoryless (or is oblivious) of
its past activity and continues to attack with the same pattern as long as its
objective remains unmet. A slight modification in the group dynamics that
assumes that a group resistance/hurdle needs to be overcome before this
modus operandi kicks in leads to a hurdle-based geometric model for {Mi}.
While these strategies are theoretically motivated and at best may de-
scribe a specific group, other groups could adopt different strategies. In fact,
strategies could also change with time. Thus, a certain model could make
more sense for a given terrorist group than other models. In our subsequent
study, we consider the following one-parameter models with support on the
nonnegative integers: Poisson, shifted zeta, and geometric. We also consider
the following two-parameter models: Po`lya,3 (nonself-exciting) hurdle-based
zeta, and hurdle-based geometric. Of these six models, the geometric and
the hurdle-based geometric allow simple recursions for estimates of model
parameter(s) via the Baum–Welch algorithm, while the shifted zeta and the
hurdle-based zeta distributions allow heavy tails; see supplementary ma-
terial, Part A [Raghavan, Galstyan and Tartakovsky (2013a)]. Further de-
tails on these models, such as the associated probability density function,
log-likelihood function, Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimate of the model
parameters and a formula for the AIC, are also provided in Raghavan, Gal-
styan and Tartakovsky (2013a). The study of fits of these models to specific
terrorist groups is undertaken in Section 6.2.
4. Detecting spurts and downfalls in activity profile. We are interested
in solving the inference problem:
ŝn|n=1,...,K = argmax
s1,...,sK∈{0,1}K
P(Si = sn, i ∈∆n|{Mj , j = 1, · · · ,N}).(4.1)
In particular, we are interested in identifying state transitions that corre-
spond to either a spurt or a downfall in activity.
Since we are interested in tracking changes in the latent attributes of the
group, we focus on an observation sequence that captures the resilience of
the group and another that reflects the level of coordination in the group
[Santos (2011), Lindberg (2010)]. In particular, the ability of a group to
2While the infinite resource assumption is impractical in capturing the dynamics of
terrorist groups, it allows us to mathematically motivate the geometric model.
3Also referred to as negative binomial with positive real parameter.
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sustain terrorist activity over a number of days reflects its capacity to reju-
venate itself from asset (manpower, material and skill-set) losses. And the
ability of the group to launch multiple attacks over a given time period
reflects its capacity to coordinate these assets necessary for simultaneous
action often over a wide geography. That is, mathematically speaking, the
focus is on: (i) Xn, the number of days of terrorist activity, and (ii) Yn, the
total number of attacks, both within the δ-day time window ∆n:
Xn =
∑
i∈∆n
1({Mi > 0}); Yn =
∑
i∈∆n
Mi, n= 1,2, . . . ,
where 1(·) denotes the indicator function of the set under consideration.
Note that Yn/δ is the average number of attacks per day and, thus, Yn is a
reflection of the intensity of attacks launched by the group. In general, Xn
is more indicative of resilience in the group, whereas Yn captures the level
of coordination better.
To build a model-driven detection strategy, we now develop a probabilistic
model for Xn and Yn. For this, we leverage the rare nature of terrorism to
hypothesize that most terrorist groups tend to be in an Inactive state for
far longer than in an Active state. Thus, it is reasonable4 to assume that
Si = 0 for long stretches of time and γ0 ≈ 0, where
γj , P(Mi > 0|Si = j), j = 0,1.(4.2)
Over such a long stretch where Si = 0, an elementary consequence of (4.2)
is that Xn is a binomial random variable with parameters δ and γ0:
P(Xn = k) =
(
δ
k
)
· (γ0)
k · (1− γ0)
δ−k.
If δ is sufficiently large (typical values used in subsequent case studies are
δ = 15 to 30 days) so that the binning/edge effects can be neglected, Xn can
be well approximated by a Poisson random variable with rate parameter δγ0.
In fact, we have the following bound [Teerapabolarn (2012), Corollary 3.2] on
the approximability of the binomial distribution by Poisson for k = 0, . . . , δ:
|PBin(Xn = k)−PPoi(Xn = k)| ≤min
(
1− e−δγ0 ,
δγ0
k
)
· γ0 ≈ 0.(4.3)
Equivalently, let Tk, k = 1,2, . . . denote the time to the kth day of terror-
ist activity (with T0 set to T0 = 0). Then, ∆Tk = Tk − Tk−1 denotes the
time to the subsequent day of activity (inter-arrival duration) and ∆Tk is
approximately exponential with mean 1/γ0. While a similar reasoning sug-
gests that ∆Tk in the Active state is exponential with mean 1/γ1, this fit
4Note that in (4.2) we have not made any specific assumptions on the distribution of
Mi. In fact, we have only labeled the quantity in (4.2) as γj .
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is bound to be good only in the first-order sense because a terrorist group
is expected to stay in the Active state for relatively shorter durations and
γ1≫ γ0. Rephrasing the above conclusions, a discrete-time Poisson process
model is a good model for the days of terrorist activity, especially in the
Inactive state.
Under the same assumptions (as above), in the Inactive state, Yn can be
rewritten as
Yn =
∑
i∈An
Mi,
where An ⊂∆n is the set of days of activity in ∆n with |An|=Xn. Thus,
Yn can be approximated as a compound Poisson random variable [Cox and
Isham (1980)] whose density is expressed in terms of the density function of
Mi. For example, if Mi is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) as
geometric with P(Mi = k|Si = 0) = (1− γ0) · (γ0)
k, k ≥ 0, a simple computa-
tion [see Raghavan, Galstyan and Tartakovsky (2013a)] shows that
P(Yn = r) = (1− γ0)
δ · (γ0)
r ·
(
δ+ r− 1
r
)
, r≥ 0.
Similarly, the joint density of (Xn, Yn) can be written as
P(Xn = k,Yn = r) = (1− γ0)
δ(γ0)
r ·
(
δ
k
)
·
(
r− 1
r− k
)
, r≥ k,
where the condition r ≥ k ensures that at least one attack occurs on a day
of activity. With the more general hurdle-based geometric model, where
P(Mi = k|Si = 0) =
{
1− γ0, k = 0,
γ0(1− µ0) · (µ0)
k−1, k ≥ 1,
the joint density is given as
P(Xn = k,Yn = r) =
(
δ
k
)(
r− 1
r− k
)
· (1− γ0)
δ−k(γ0)
k · (1− µ0)
k(µ0)
r−k,
r≥ k.
Replacement of γ0 and µ0 with γ1 and µ1 in the Active state works subject
to the same issues/constraints as stated earlier.
We now propose a strategy that exploits the underlying HMM structure
to detect changes in group dynamics. For this, we treat as observations
{Xn}, {Yn} and the joint sequence {(Xn, Yn)} under different modeling as-
sumptions on {Mi}. We first apply the classical HMM formulation [Rabiner
(1989)] where the Baum–Welch algorithm is used to learn the parameters
that determine the density function of the observations. For the Baum–
Welch algorithm to converge to a local maximum (with respect to the log-
likelihood function) in the parameter space, a sufficient condition is that
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the density function of the observation be log-concave [Rabiner (1989), Sec-
tion IVA, page 267]. Under the i.i.d. geometric and hurdle-based geometric
models for {Mi}, it is established in Raghavan, Galstyan and Tartakovsky
(2013a) that all the three density functions are log-concave. Further, an iter-
ative update for the parameter estimates is also established under these two
models. With the converged Baum–Welch parameter estimates as the ini-
tialization, the Viterbi algorithm is then used to estimate the most probable
state sequence given the observations. The output of the Viterbi algorithm
is a state estimate for the period of interest
{Si = ŝn ∈ {0,1} for all i ∈∆n and n= 1, . . . ,K}.
A state estimate of 1 indicates that the group is Active over the period
of interest, whereas an estimate of 0 indicates that the group is Inactive.
Transition between states indicates spurt/downfall in the activity.
While we have developed a model-driven strategy, there is often an inter-
est in approaches that are independent of these parameters, and hence not
sensitive to the parameter estimation algorithms or the length of the train-
ing period. An alternate approach that does not explicitly learn the under-
lying model parameters can be developed using the Exponential Weighted
Moving-Average (EWMA) filter. Details of this approach and its compara-
tive performance with the HMM-based strategy can be found in the work
of Raghavan, Galstyan and Tartakovsky (2012).
5. Case-studies. We now undertake two case studies on the fit of a
discrete-time Poisson point process model for the days of terrorist activ-
ity. For this, we classify terrorist activities as reported in the RDWTI and
GTD that catalogue activities by different groups across the world [LaFree
and Dugan (2007), RDWTI].
5.1. FARC. We start with FARC, a Marxist-Leninist terrorist group ac-
tive over a large area in Colombia and its neighborhood. We study the
activities of FARC over the nine-year time period from 1998 to 2006. This
period covers a total of 604 terrorist incidents in the RDWTI with a yearly
breakdown of 44 incidents in 1998, 18 in 1999, 45 in 2000, 27 in 2001, 217
in 2002, 57 in 2003, 33 in 2004, 66 in 2005 and 97 in 2006, respectively.
The reasons why FARC and the 1998 to 2006 time period have been chosen
for our study are provided in supplementary material, Part B [Raghavan,
Galstyan and Tartakovsky (2013b)].
As explained in Section 4, the activity profile of FARC can be modeled as
a discrete-time sampled Poisson point process. In Figure 3, we test the fit
of this model by studying: (i) the Quantile–Quantile (Q–Q) plots compar-
ing the sample inter-arrival duration between consecutive days of terrorist
activity and an exponential random variable with an appropriately-defined
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Fig. 3. Q–Q plots of duration between days of terrorist activity with respect to a theo-
retical exponential random variable for the period from: (a) 1998 to 2001 corresponding to
normal terrorist activity, and (b) 2002 corresponding to a spurt in terrorist activity. Q–Q
plots of number of days of terrorist activity over a δ = 60 day time window with respect
to a theoretical Poisson random variable for the same two scenarios are presented in (c)
and (d).
rate parameter (γ̂), and (ii) the Q–Q plots comparing the number of days
of terrorist activity over a time window of δ days and a Poisson random
variable with parameter δγ̂. For both sets of Q–Q plots, we consider two
scenarios: the first (the 1998 to 2001 period) corresponding to a period of
“normal” terrorist activity, and the second (the 2002 period) corresponding
to a spurt in terrorist activity.
Figures 3(a) and (b) compare the Q–Q plots of the sample inter-arrival
duration under these two scenarios with an exponential random variable.
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The rate parameter used for the exponential is
γ̂ =
1
E[∆Tk]
,(5.1)
where E[∆Tk] is the sample mean of the inter-arrival duration over the con-
sidered period. From Figure 3, we note that both in periods of normal as
well as a spurt in activity, the Q–Q plot is nearly linear with a few sample
outliers in the tails. These outliers indicate that an exponential model for
inter-arrival duration is not accurate because of the heavy tails. Nevertheless,
to a first-order, an exponential random variable serves as a good fit for the
inter-arrival durations. Our numerical study leads to the following estimates
for γ•: (a) γ̂ ≈ 0.0857, (b) γ̂ ≈ 0.4185, suggesting that a spurt in activity is
associated with an increase in the rate parameter. Similarly, in Figures 3(c)
and (d), we compare the Q–Q plots of the number of days of terrorist ac-
tivity over a δ = 60 day time window under the same scenarios (as above)
with a theoretical Poisson random variable of parameter δγ̂ = 60γ̂. While we
observe some outliers in the tail quantiles, a Poisson random variable seems
to be a good first-order fit for the number of days of terrorist activity.
As explained in Section 4, a geometric model is assumed for {Mi} and the
Baum–Welch algorithm is used to learn the underlying γj with {Xn}, {Yn}
and {(Xn, Yn)} over a given δ-day time window as training data. Specif-
ically, Table 1 summarizes the parameter estimates for different δ values
when {(Xn, Yn)} is used as a training set. It is to be noted that the learned
parameter values remain stable across a large range of δ (1 to 30 days) val-
ues. The performance of the Baum–Welch algorithm is also robust to both
the length of the training set as well as the initialization. Further, the param-
eter values also remain essentially independent of whether {Xn}, {Yn} or
{(Xn, Yn)} is used for training. For example, with δ = 15 and {(Xn, Yn)} as
training data, the parameter values learned are γ̂0 = 0.0924 and γ̂1 = 0.3605,
whereas with {Xn}, these values are γ̂0 = 0.0941 and γ̂1 = 0.3861. This ob-
servation is not entirely surprising since {Mi} is assumed to come from a
one-parameter model family and conditioned on one of the two variables
(Xn or Yn), the other variable adds no significant new information about
the model parameter.
The converged Baum–Welch parameter estimates are then used to ini-
tialize the Viterbi algorithm to obtain the most probable state sequence for
FARC. Figures 4(a)–(c) illustrate the state classification for a δ = 15 day
time window with {Xn}, {Yn} and {(Xn, Yn)} as observations. As can be
seen from Figure 4, the state classification approach detects even small and
nonpersistent changes. Further, the Viterbi algorithm declares 51 and 46 of
the 219 time windows as Active with {Xn} and {Yn}, respectively, whereas
the joint sequence {(Xn, Yn)} results in the same classification as {Yn}.
Table 1 summarizes the number of time windows classified as Active for
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Table 1
State classification of FARC with the geometric and hurdle-based geometric models and
{(Xn, Yn)} as observations for different time window periods (δ)
Parameters learned
δ (in
days) γ̂0 γ̂1
Length of training
set (N time
windows)
No. of Active
states (Nspurt
time windows)
Fractional
activity
(f =
Nspurt·δ
N
)
1 0.0924 0.3597 3286 483 0.1469
5 0.0919 0.3584 657 140 0.2130
7 0.0924 0.3598 469 89 0.1895
10 0.0911 0.3568 328 73 0.2221
15 0.0924 0.3605 219 46 0.2099
25 0.0908 0.3592 131 26 0.1977
30 0.0930 0.3593 109 20 0.1825
Parameters learned
δ (in
days) γ̂0 µ̂0 γ̂1 µ̂1
Length of training
set (N time
windows)
No. of Active
states (Nspurt
time windows)
Fractional
activity
(f =
Nspurt·δ
N
)
1 0.0950 0.0752 0.3982 0.3083 3286 484 0.1472
5 0.0942 0.0730 0.3934 0.3066 657 140 0.2130
7 0.0949 0.0742 0.3956 0.3081 469 87 0.1853
10 0.0936 0.0724 0.3891 0.3044 328 71 0.2160
15 0.0958 0.0759 0.4019 0.3103 219 42 0.1917
25 0.0934 0.0738 0.3957 0.3046 131 26 0.1977
30 0.0954 0.0794 0.3966 0.3073 109 20 0.1825
different δ values with {(Xn, Yn)} as observations. This study also suggests
that δ = 10 to 15 with the HMM approach optimally trading off the twin
objectives of detecting minor spurts in the activity profile of FARC (larger
Nspurt) as well as minimizing the number of Active state classifications that
require further attention (smaller fractional activity f).
We now consider a more general two-parameter hurdle-based geometric
model for {Mi} that potentially allows the joint sequence {(Xn, Yn)} to
result in better inferencing on the states than either {Xn} or {Yn}. As before,
the Baum–Welch algorithm is used to learn the underlying parameters with
different values of δ and {(Xn, Yn)} as training data. Table 1 summarizes
these parameter estimates and, as was the case earlier, it can be seen that
the estimates remain stable across δ. The parameter estimates are then used
with the Viterbi algorithm to infer the most probable state sequence [see
Figure 4(d) for state classification in the δ = 15 setting]. While Figure 4(d)
and Table 1 show that the classification with the hurdle-based model agrees
with the simpler geometric model for many δ values, in the setting of interest
(δ = 7 to 15 days), the hurdle-based model is more conservative in declaring
an Active state. The four time windows of disagreement between the hurdle-
based geometric and geometric models for δ = 15 correspond to the boundary
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Fig. 4. State classification via Viterbi algorithm with the geometric model for {Mi};
Observations being (a) {Xn}, (b) {Yn} and (c) {(Xn, Yn)} with parameters learned by
Baum–Welch algorithm. (d) State classification with the hurdle-based geometric model for
the observation sequence {(Xn, Yn)}.
of minor spurts (time windows 11, 64, 191 and 204), where the hurdle-
based model is more conservative in declaring an Active state, whereas the
geometric model is trigger-happy.
5.2. Shining Path. The second case study is the activity profile of Sendero
Luminoso (more popularly known as Shining Path), a terrorist group in
Peru. With a focus on the sixteen-year period between 1981 and 1996, the
RDWTI reports a total of 163 incidents with a yearly breakdown of 10 in-
cidents in 1981, 7 in 1982, 10 in 1983, 7 in 1984, 3 in 1985, 12 in 1986, 19
in 1987, 7 in 1988, 18 in 1989, 10 in 1990, 31 in 1991, 10 in 1992, 14 in
1993, 2 in 1994, 2 in 1995 and 1 in 1996. The choice of Shining Path and the
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Fig. 5. (a) Number of days of terrorist activity, and (b) Total number of attacks in a
δ = 25 day time window as a function of time for Shining Path.
1981 to 1996 time period are motivated in supplementary material, Part B
[Raghavan, Galstyan and Tartakovsky (2013b)].
In Figure 5, we plot the number of days of terrorist activity and the total
number of attacks over a δ = 25 day time window. In Figure 6, we test the
fit of inter-arrival duration between successive days of terrorist activity with
respect to an exponential random variable with parameter γ̂ estimated as
in (5.1). As noted in supplementary material, Part B [Raghavan, Galstyan
and Tartakovsky (2013b)], the evolution of Shining Path can be partitioned
into four distinct phases. The inter-arrival duration in each phase can be
distinctly modeled as an exponential random variable and Figure 6 shows
that this partitioning is reasonable. As in the case with FARC, the expo-
nential random variable is a good first approximation, as the tails are not
well modeled with this random variable. Our numerical study leads to the
following estimates for γ• in the four phases: (a) γ̂ ≈ 0.0211, (b) γ̂ ≈ 0.0344,
(c) γ̂ ≈ 0.0755, (d) γ̂ ≈ 0.0158.
As elucidated with the FARC data set, the data corresponding to Shining
Path is studied in the following experiment. Using the HMM approach with
the hurdle-based geometric model described in Section 4, the Baum–Welch
algorithm results in parameter estimates as in Table 2 for different values of
δ. State classification via the Viterbi algorithm using these estimates results
in an Active/Inactive classification for Shining Path, for example, Figure 7
displays a typical classification for δ = 25. It is important to note that while
four distinct phases are identified in the evolution of Shining Path, only a d=
2-state HMM is studied here. For the purpose of spurt/downfall detection,
even this coarse model is sufficient. As can be seen with FARC data, even
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Fig. 6. Q–Q plots of duration between days of terrorist activity with respect to a theoret-
ical exponential distribution for the period from: (a) 1981 to 1986, (b) 1987 to 1990, (c)
1991, and (d) 1992 to 1996 corresponding to different stages of evolution of Shining Path.
small and nonpersistent changes are detected by the HMM approach, further
confirming its usefulness.
6. Revisiting some of the modeling issues. We now revisit some of the
modeling issues that shed further light on development of good models for
the activity profile of terrorist groups.
6.1. Clustering of attacks. A central premise in terrorism modeling is
that the current activity of a terrorist group is influenced by its past activity.
One consequence of this premise is that the attacks perpetrated by the
group are clustered [Midlarsky (1978), Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida
(1980)]. Ripley’s K(·) function is a statistical tool for measuring the degree
of clustering (aggregatedness) or inhibition (regularity) in a point process
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Table 2
State classification of Shining Path with the hurdle-based geometric model and
{(Xn, Yn)} as observations for different time window periods (δ)
Parameters learned
δ (in
days) γ̂0 µ̂0 γ̂1 µ̂1
Length of training
set (N time
windows)
No. of Active
states (Nspurt
time windows)
Fractional
activity
(f =
Nspurt·δ
N
)
20 0.0262 0.1026 0.1000 0.6667 268 69 0.2575
25 0.0264 0.1019 0.0800 0.6667 215 35 0.1628
28 0.0264 0.1019 0.0714 0.6667 192 15 0.0781
30 0.0262 0.1026 0.0667 0.6667 179 14 0.0782
32 0.0202 0.0703 0.1072 0.2255 168 38 0.2262
as a function of inter-point distance [Diggle (2003)]. Specifically, if λ is the
intensity of the point process, λK(h) is the expected number of other points
within a distance h of a randomly chosen point of the process:
K(h),
1
λ
· E[Number of other points within distance h
of a randomly chosen point].
Expressions for K(h) can be derived for a number of stationary point process
models [Dixon (2002)]. For example, in the case of a one-dimensional/tem-
poral point process that is completely random (where points are distributed
uniformly and independently in time), it can be shown that K(h) = 2h.
A two-dimensional complete random spatial point process leads to K(h) =
πh2. In the context of an activity profile, K(h) can be estimated as
K̂(h) =
1
λ̂ ·N
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
1(|ti − tj| ≤ h) =
1
(λ̂)2 · N
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
1(|ti− tj| ≤ h),(6.1)
Fig. 7. State classification for Shining Path data (δ = 25 days).
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where ti is the ith day of activity, N is the number of attacks in the obser-
vation period of N days (i.e., [t1, . . . , tN ] = [Day1, . . . ,DayN ]), and λ̂ =
N
N
is an estimate of the intensity (rate) of the process. Significant deviations of
K̂(h) from 2h indicate that the hypothesis of complete randomness becomes
untenable with observed data and more confidence is reposed on clustering
[if K̂(h)≫ 2h] or inhibition [if K̂(h)≪ 2h].
While the definition in (6.1) assumes a homogenous point process, exten-
sions to an inhomogenous point process have also been proposed [Baddeley,
Møller and Waagepetersen (2000), Veen and Schoenberg (2006)], where the
point process is re-weighted by the reciprocal of the nonconstant intensity
function to offset the inhomogeneity. Further, to compensate for edge effects
due to points outside the observation period being left out in the numerator
of (6.1), various edge-correction estimators have also been proposed in the
literature. Combining these two facets, we have the following estimator5 for
K(h):
K̂(h) =
1
N
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
1(|ti − tj | ≤ h)
p̂ip̂jwij
,(6.2)
where p̂i is the estimated probability of at least one attack on ti. In this
work, we use an edge-correction factor wij due to Ripley [Cressie (1991),
pages 616–618] which reflects the proportion of the period centered at ti
and covering the jth day of activity that is included in the observation
period:
wij =

1, if t1 +R≤ ti ≤ tN −R,
tN − ti +R
2R
, if ti >max(tN −R, t1+R),
R+ ti− t1
2R
, if ti <min(tN −R, t1 +R),
tN − t1
2R
, if tN −R≤ ti ≤ t1 +R,
where R= |ti − tj|.
In Figure 8(a), we plot K(h) − 2h computed as in (6.2) for the FARC
data set (with and without edge-correction) as a function of the inter-point
distance h. In line with the observation by Porter and White (2012) for the
Indonesia/Timor-Leste data set, the plot here indicates that the FARC data
is also clustered since K(h)− 2h≫ 0, thus motivating the SEHM.
The main theme of this work, however, is that clustering is essentially
a reflection of state transitions and the activity sub-profile (sub-series) of
5Note that Porter and White propose a one-sided estimator for K(h) and they compare
K̂(h) with h (instead of 2h) to test for clustering/inhibition.
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Fig. 8. (a) K(h) as a function of inter-point distance h for the activity profile of FARC
and under the two states of the HMM, (b) fractional change in state classification relative
to addition of missing data from GTD.
the group conditioned on a given state value is not clustered. To test this
hypothesis, we study the behavior of K(h) for the sub-series from the FARC
data set corresponding to the Active and Inactive states as classified by the
methodology of Section 5.1. Since the latent states of the group transition
back and forth, an Active sub-series is constructed by patching together the
group’s activity profile in the Active state with the jump random variable
between any two disjoint pieces of the activity profile modeled as Poisson
with parameter λ̂= NN . For this sub-series,K(h) is estimated using a formula
analogous to (6.2), where p̂i and wij are re-estimated for the sub-series, and
N is replaced with Nact:
Nact =min(Number of days in Active state, Length of Active sub-series).
A confidence interval can also be constructed using the bootstrap technique
(resampling from the underlying data distribution). A similar estimation
process yields K(h) and the corresponding confidence interval for the Inac-
tive sub-series.
In contrast to the trends for the unclassified activity profile, both the
sub-series indicate an inhibitory behavior (mild inhibition for the Active
state and stronger inhibition for the Inactive state) in Figure 8(a). Further,
K(h)− 2h lies within the 95% confidence interval (computed using a 1000-
point resampling) for almost all h values with the Active sub-series and for
a significant fraction of h values with the Inactive sub-series. The stronger
inhibition in the Inactive state should not be entirely surprising since very
few attacks happen in this state. The absence of clustering in the activity
profile conditioned on the latent state suggests that the clustering of attacks
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Table 3
Histogram of observed number of attacks per day for FARC data with different model fits,
δ = 15 days
Hurdle-based Hurdle-based
No. attacks Obs. Poisson Shifted zeta Geomet. Po`lya textbfzeta geomet.
(Inactive state)
0 2420 2421 2470 2430 2421 2420 2421
1 227 225 144 207 225 229 226
2 9 11 27 18 11 7 10
3 1 0 8 2 0 1 0
4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
> 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
AIC 1690.34 1772.81 1696.74 1692.32 1692.58 1691.86
Parameter 0.0933 4.105 0.0854 r̂0 = 24.4749, γ̂0 = 0.0892, µ̂0 = 0.0444,
Estimate ŷ0 = 0.0038 ŷ0 = 5.10 γ̂0 = 0.0892
(Active state)
0 384 359 455 404 389 384 384
1 174 202 87 144 160 189 171
2 46 57 33 52 56 31 52
3 19 11 16 19 17 11 16
4 4 1 9 7 6 5 5
> 4 3 0 30 4 2 10 2
AIC 1313.88 1416.88 1291.73 1288.85 1308.09 1287.11
Parameter 0.5651 2.40 0.3611 r̂1 = 1.4834, γ̂1 = 0.3905, µ̂1 = 0.3090,
Estimate ŷ1 = 0.2759 ŷ1 = 2.61 γ̂1 = 0.3905
can also be explained as arising due to different intensity profiles in the
different states. Thus, the HMM framework offers a competing approach to
explain the clustering of attacks.
6.2. Model for observation densities. We now develop simple models for
the observation density under the two states. For this, we study the good-
ness of fit captured by the AIC for several models with support on the
nonnegative integers to describe data from FARC. In Table 3, we present
the histogram of the number of days with ℓ (ℓ = 0,1, . . .) attacks per day
for FARC data. Applying the state classification algorithm described in Sec-
tion 4 with δ = 15, FARC stays in the Inactive state for 2657 days and in
the Active state for 630 days. Also, presented in the same table are the
(rounded-off) expected number of days with ℓ attacks for the six models
described in supplementary material, Part A, along with the AIC for these
model fits. While the corresponding data for δ = 10 is not presented here
due to space constraints, FARC stays in the Inactive state for 2577 days
and in the Active state for 710 days in this setting.
The ML parameter estimates for all the six models remain robust as δ
is varied, which is in conformity with the stability of the converged Baum–
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Welch parameter estimates with δ (see Tables 1 and 2). Further, from Ta-
ble 3, in the Inactive state, it is seen that all the models except the shifted
zeta result in comparable fits. Specifically, the hurdle-based geometric model
differs from the observed histogram in only one day and results in the second
lowest AIC value. On the other hand, in the Active state, the hurdle-based
geometric model produces the best fit with only the Po`lya model resulting
in a comparable fit. In this setting, the one-parameter models overestimate
either the tail or the days of no activity, while the hurdle-based zeta pro-
duces a heavier tail than what the data exhibits. In fact, the poorest fit in
either state is obtained with the shifted zeta suggesting that a heavy tail
may not always be necessary. In contrast, the Indonesia/Timor-Leste data
studied in Porter and White (2012) exhibits several extreme values (e.g.,
days with 36,11 and 10 attacks) and the authors observe that a self-exciting
hurdle-based zeta model captures the heavy tails much better than other
models. The FARC data set used here shows a maximum of 7 attacks per
day, whereas the Shining Path data set shows a maximum of 3 attacks per
day. Even simple nonself-exciting models are enough to capture these data
sets well.
This study suggests the following:
• If parsimony of the model is of critical importance, the geometric distri-
bution serves as the best one-parameter model with the Poisson/shifted
zeta models either under-estimating or overestimating the number of days
with no activity in the Active state.
• If parsimony is not a critical issue and the data does not have (or has
very few) extreme values, the hurdle-based geometric model serves as the
best/near-best model in either state.
• However, if the data has several extreme values [as seen in Porter and
White (2012)], the self-exciting hurdle model offers the best model fit,
albeit at the expense of learning several model parameters.
6.3. Inter-arrival duration. We now study the efficacy of the HMM frame-
work by testing the goodness of fit of the theoretical exponential random
variable with respect to the inter-arrival duration between days of terrorist
activity in either state. To avoid estimating the rate parameters of the expo-
nential random variables from the data (which complicates the hypothesis
tests), we use the fact from Seshadri, Csorgo and Stephens (1969) that if
y1, . . . , ym are i.i.d. exponential random variables (with a given rate param-
eter), then
zj =
∑j
i=1 yi∑m
i=1 yi
, j = 1, . . . ,m(6.3)
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Table 4
KS test-statistic in the two states for FARC data set
Active Inactive
Total number of samples 245 236
No. of samples with ∆Tk ≤ β nA = 234, β = 15 nI = 192, β = 20
KS statistic 0.0597 0.0492
p-value 0.3763 0.7905
are i.i.d. uniformly distributed in [0,1]. We then use a Kolmogorov–Smirnov
(KS) test to study the fit between the empirical cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of zj and the uniform CDF [Durbin (1973)].
The KS test-statistic (denoted as KS•) and the critical value for the test
(denoted as Kα) corresponding to a significance level α and computed using
the standard asymptotic formula are given as
KS• =max
x
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n•
n•∑
i=1
1(z•i ≤ x)− x
∣∣∣∣∣,
Kα =
√
−(1/2) log(α/2)
n•
,
where n• is the number of samples and {z
•
i } are the transformed samples
computed using (6.3) in either state. The results of applying the KS test
to the two states are presented in Table 4. From this table, it is clear that
the samples in either state fit the theoretical exponential assumption very
accurately with the exponential model rejected in the Active (and Inac-
tive) state(s) if the significance level α exceeds α > 0.3763 (and α > 0.7905),
respectively.
In a recent analysis of FARC activities using the MIPT database over the
time period 1998 to 2005, Clauset and Gleditsch (2012) hypothesize that
the inter-arrival duration between successive days of attacks “decreases con-
sistently, albeit stochastically” with the cumulative number of events FARC
has carried out—a measure of the group’s experience. Our initial studies
indicate that while this hypothesis holds empirically true for k ≤ 25 attacks
that encompass the period January 1 to June 27, 1998, it consistently in-
creases through the subsequent period lasting till March 10, 2000. Note that
this is the precise time period of increased U.S. funding to combat FARC
and the drug economy through Plan Colombia [Haugaard, Isacson and Olson
(2005)] and a mean increase in the time to the next day of activity indicates
an impact of counter-terrorism efforts. The following period through Au-
gust 13, 2004 indicates a reversed trend of consistent decrease, suggesting
that the organizational dynamics of FARC had “adjusted” to the new real-
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ity of combat with the establishment. As seen earlier, such distinct changes
in the organizational dynamics (associated with spurts and downfalls) are
quickly identified by the approaches proposed in this work.
6.4. Robustness of proposed approach to missing data. We now study
the robustness of the proposed spurt detection approach in terms of state
classification to attacks that are not available in the database. Toward this
goal, we treat the FARC data from RDWTI over the 1998 to 2006 period
as the baseline data set and add one missing day of activity per year from
the GTD in a sequential manner and revisit state classification with the
enhanced data set. Specifically, the fraction of missing data added in the
jth (sequential) step is the ratio of the difference between new and old
attacks and the baseline, and is defined as
Frac. Missing Data(j),
∑N
i=1 M˜
j
i −Mi∑N
i=1Mi
,
where M˜ ji is the number of attacks on the ith day with data addition.
Applying the state estimation algorithm proposed in Section 4 to this new
data set, let ŝnewi,j ∈ {0,1} denote the estimated state value on the ith day
(i= 1, . . . ,N ). The fractional change in state classification is then defined as
Frac. State Classification Changes(j),
∑N
i=1 |ŝ
new
i,j − ŝi|
N
,
with ŝi denoting the state classification on the ith day with the baseline
data set.
In Figure 8(b), Frac. Missing Data(j) is plotted as a function of Frac.
StateClassification Changes(j). In general, combining terrorism information
from two different databases with a clear dichotomy in terms of data col-
lection standards (criteria for inclusion and noninclusion of events, source
material used, etc.) can introduce a systematic bias in terrorism trends. De-
spite this anomaly, it is clear from Figure 8(b) that the proposed approach
is remarkably robust to a small amount of missing data. For example, the
addition of an ≈ 5% more data to the baseline data set leads to essentially
no changes in state classification with the baseline data set. On the other
extreme, big additions of even up to 65% more data result in only an ≈ 10%
mismatch in state classifications.
6.5. Comparing the TAR, SEHM and HMM frameworks. It is impor-
tant to compare the proposed HMM framework with the existing TAR and
SEHM frameworks in terms of the models’ explanatory and predictive pow-
ers. While this comparison requires a careful study of performance across
data sets (and is the subject of ongoing work), we now provide initial re-
sults in this direction. We study both models’ ability to explain the times
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Table 5
Comparison between AIC and SMAPE scores with SEHM and HMM for FARC and
Indonesia/Timor-Leste data sets
AIC SMAPE
FARC Indonesia/Timor-Leste FARC Indonesia/Timor-Leste
n SEHM HMM n SEHM HMM n SEHM HMM n SEHM HMM
100 671.68 671.06 100 723.78 729.47 100 46.27% 52.78% 100 46.33% 43.32%
200 1117.40 1112.07 165 1091.78 1116.92 150 42.95% 35.75% 125 45.47% 41.89%
300 1521.93 1521.36 200 1283.08 1305.27 200 40.40% 35.61% 150 42.84% 38.75%
400 2127.55 2121.81 250 1589.43 1615.87 250 40.09% 38.14% 175 45.23% 38.00%
450 2333.88 2327.02 300 2018.92 2041.35 300 39.92% 37.35% 200 43.46% 33.99%
to the subsequent day of activity {∆T n1 } and their ability to predict ∆Tn+1
given {∆T n1 }. We validate both models with the FARC data set and the
Indonesia/Timor-Leste data set6 studied by Porter and White (2012).
The different baseline and self-exciting models considered in Porter and
White (2012) are used to model {∆T n1 } for both data sets. The fmincon
function in MATLAB is used to learn model parameters that maximize the
likelihood function [see Porter and White (2012), equation (8)]. It turns
out that a four-parameter model (one parameter for the trend component
and three parameters for the negative binomial self-exciting component) is a
good model for both data sets. Table 5 shows the AIC comparison between
this four-parameter SEHM and the four-parameter HMM for the two data
sets. The results suggest that from an explanatory viewpoint, the SEHM
is a better model than the HMM for the Indonesia/Timor-Leste data set,
whereas the HMM is better than the SEHM for the FARC data set.
For comparing the predictive powers, model parameters are learned with
{∆T n1 } as training data, and a conditional mean estimator of the form
∆˜Tn+1 = E[∆Tn+1|∆T
n
1 ] is used for prediction. For the HMM framework,
it can be checked that
∆˜Tn+1|HMM =
1∑
i=0
P(Qn+1 = i|∆T
n
1 )E[∆Tn+1|Qn+1 = i]
(a)
=
1∑
i=0
βiE[∆Tn+1|Qn+1 = i],
6The Indonesia/Timor-Leste data set from GTD extracted in January 2013 consists
of 291 attacks over 165 unique event days for the 1/1/1994 to 12/31/2000 period. The
corresponding data set in Porter and White (2012) consists of 250 attacks over 158 unique
event days. The discrepancy can be explained as the addition of attacks to the GTD since
the work of Porter and White (2012). Nevertheless, this discrepancy is not serious since
we learn the model parameters for the enhanced data set from scratch.
26 V. RAGHAVAN, A. GALSTYAN AND A. G. TARTAKOVSKY
where (a) follows from straightforward computations with
βi =
∑
j αn(j)P(Qn+1 = i|Qn = j)∑
j αn(j)
and αn(j) = P(∆T
n
1 ,Qn = j) is updated via the forward procedure [Rabiner
(1989)]. For the SEHM framework, from (2.1), we have
∆˜Tn+1|SEHM =
1
1− e−(Bn+SEn(Hn−1))
.
For the sake of comparison, we also use a sample mean estimator as a base-
line:
∆˜Tn+1|Baseline =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∆Ti.
To compare the three prediction algorithms, we use the Symmetric Mean
Absolute Percentage Error (SMAPE) score, defined as
SMAPE,
1
N
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∆Ti − ∆˜Ti
∆Ti + ∆˜Ti
∣∣∣∣.(6.4)
Recall that the SMAPE score captures the relative error in prediction and
is a number between 0% and 100% with a smaller value indicating a better
prediction algorithm. The SMAPE scores of the time to the next day of
activity for the three estimators (HMM, SEHM and baseline) are plotted as
a function of the training period for model learning in Figure 9(a) for the
FARC data set and in Figure 9(b) for the Indonesia/Timor-Leste data set.
It can be seen from Figure 9 that for both the data sets, the HMM results in
a better prediction than the SEHM and the baseline provided the training
period is long to ensure accurate model learning for the HMM.
We now provide a qualitative comparison between the TAR, SEHM and
HMM frameworks. While all the three models assume that the current ob-
servation/activity is dependent on the past history, the models differ in
how this dependence is realized. In particular, in the TAR model, the cur-
rent observation is explicitly dependent on the past observations along with
(possibly) the impact from other independent variables corresponding to cer-
tain geopolitical events/interventions. On the other hand, in the SEHM, the
probability of an attack is enhanced by the history of the group according
to the formula:
P(Mi > 0|Hi−1)|SEHM
P(Mi > 0|Hi−1)|Non-SEHM
= 1+
e−Bi
1− e−Bi
· (1− e−SEi(Hi−1))≥ 1.
The HMM combines both these facets by introducing a hidden state se-
quence. The state sequence depends explicitly on its most immediate past
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Fig. 9. SMAPE scores for the three models with (a) FARC data and (b) Indone-
sia/Timor-Leste data.
(one-step Markovian structure), whereas the probability of an attack is en-
hanced based on the state realization.
The TAR model and the HMM are similar from the viewpoint of regime
switching, as these features are modeled explicitly. However, the mechanism
of regime switching is different in the two cases: the former assumes a change
in the auto-regressive process, whereas the latter assumes a state transition
in the HMM. The SEHM also incorporates a switch between states (induced
by the self-exciting component), but this switch is more of an implicit feature
of the model rather than an explicit component.
More importantly, the TARmodel considers global terrorism trends rather
than trends constrained to a specific region or a specific group. Similarly, the
Indonesia/Timor-Leste data set considered by Porter and White (2012) is
a collation of all attacks in Indonesia and Timor-Leste from diverse groups
with significantly different Intentions and Capabilities profiles such as Dar-
ul-Islam, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Jemaah Islamiyah, etc. On the other hand,
the FARC data set considered here is exclusively the action of the many sub-
groups of FARC. This distinction between activity across groups in a specific
region versus group-based activity could explain why the HMM leads to a
better model fit for the FARC data set relative to the SEHM. This logic also
suggests that the HMM may be a poorer model for regional/global trends.
This hypothesis deserves a more careful study and is the subject of current
work.
7. Concluding remarks. This work develops a HMM framework to model
the activity profile of terrorist groups. Key to this development is the hy-
pothesis that the current activity of the group can be captured completely
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by certain states/attributes of the group, instead of the entire past history of
the group. In the simplest example of the proposed framework, the group’s
activity is captured by a d= 2 state HMM with the states reflecting a low
state of activity (Inactive) and a high state of activity (Active), respectively.
In either state, the days of activity are modeled as a discrete-time Poisson
point process with a hurdle-based geometric model being a good fit for the
number of attacks per day. While more general models can be considered,
even the simplest framework is sufficient for detecting spurts and downfalls
in the activity profile of many groups of interest. Our results show that the
HMM approach provides a competent alternate modeling framework to the
TAR and SEHM approaches, both in terms of explanatory and predictive
powers.
Fruitful directions to explore in the future include development of more
refined models for the activity profile (such as hierarchical HMMs) that
incorporate heavy tails and extreme outliers commonly observed in terrorism
data. A systematic comparison between the TAR model, SEHM and HMM
and a possible bridge between these classes will also be of interest. In terms
of inferencing, nonlinear filtering approaches such as particle filters are of
importance in practice. Given the intensive nature of data collection that
is common for studies of this nature, it would be of interest in developing
broad trends and trade-offs in quantitative terrorism studies with a large set
of groups from different ideological proclivities.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Supplement A: Information on models for the number of attacks per day
studied in this work (DOI: 10.1214/13-AOAS682SUPPA; .pdf). This section
derives the ML and Baum–Welch estimate of model parameter(s) under the
geometric and hurdle-based geometric assumptions on {Mi}.
Supplement B: Background information on FARC and shining path (DOI:
10.1214/13-AOAS682SUPPB; .pdf). This section motivates the choice of the
terrorist groups and the corresponding time periods of interest that are the
focus of this work.
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